Republic of the
Philippines
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
8th
Judicial Region
Branch 6
Bulwagan Ng
Katarungan
Tacloban City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
-
versus - Criminal
Case No. 99458
for Libel
OSCAR CLAUDE MONET
Accused.
---------------------------------------------
OPPOSITION TO URGENT MOTION TO RESET HEARING WITH
PRAYER FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE INSTANT CASE
Accused
Oscar Claude Monet, by counsel, respectfully states:
1. On September 11,
2018, plaintiff filed an urgent motion to reset the hearing set on September
12, 2018, at 8:30 a.m. on the ground that his first witness is not available on
September 12, 2018.
2. But accused must
oppose the urgent motion and pray for the dismissal of the instant case.
3. It will be
recalled that the prosecution has moved for resetting of the hearings for six
(6) times already since 2015, which the Court generously granted. The urgent
motion to reset is again based on an equivocal ground that the first witness
for the prosecution is not available. This is unjustified.
BACKGROUND
An Information for Libel with Damages was filed before
this Court on June 26, 2014, against the accused, with John Ruskin as the
private complainant. Sometime in February 2015, the pre-trial conference was
conducted and the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence and
witnesses. However, for more than three (3) years now, the prosecution has
failed to present its first witness.
ARGUMENT
A.
Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court (Three-day Notice Rule)
“Every written motion required to be
heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as
to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the
date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.”
The prosecution’s urgent motion to
reset the hearing scheduled on September 12, 2018, was filed on September 11,
2018, or only one day before the scheduled hearing. This is a violation of the
three-day rule notice under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.
“The rule is that a party asking for
postponement has absolutely no right to assume that its motion would be
granted, especially on less than three days’ notice, and must be in court
prepared on the day of the hearing.” (Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 123997, January 20, 1999)
B.
Sec. 10 of Supreme Court Circular
38-1998 (Factors for Granting Continuance)
“x x x. No continuance
under subparagraph (f) of Section 9 hereof shall be granted because of
congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure
to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.”
In the urgent
motion, the prosecution does not cite any justifiable reason(s) as to why the
witness is unavailable and/or whether due diligence has been exercised by the
prosecution to ensure availability of the witness considering that, three (3)
years and six continuances later, it has failed to present its first witness.
Fittingly, the urgent motion falls under the enumeration of factors in Section
10 of SSC 38-1998 where continuance shall not be granted and, therefore, must
be denied.
C.
Sec. III (2) (d) of OCA Circular No. 101-2017, Revised
Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases
“(d) Motion for Postponement. – A motion for postponement is prohibited,
except if it is based on acts of God, force
majeure or physical inability of the witness to appear and testify. If the
motion is granted based on such expectations, the moving party shall be warned
that the presentation of its evidence must still be finished on the dates
previously agreed upon.”
The basis for postponement indicated in the urgent motion to reset
hearing is that “the first witness for the prosecution is not available…” However, the reason propounded by plaintiff does
not fall under any of the exceptions to the prohibition on the Motion for
Postponement, to wit: acts of God, force
majeure or physical inability of the witness to appear and testify. A
witness presumed being “not available” does not necessarily mean the existence
of a “physical inability” to appear and testify. Non-availability could merely
be due to the witness attending to a matter he perceives to be more important
than testifying in court, which is a matter of choice, whereas physical
inability signifies the impossibility of bodily appearing in court due to
circumstances beyond his control.
Indeed, the rationale for the
implementation of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases
(Revised Guidelines) is “to protect
and advance the constitutional rights of persons to a speedy disposition of
their criminal cases, to reinforce and give teeth to the existing rules on
criminal procedure and other special rules prescribing periods for court action
and those which promote speedy disposition of criminal cases.”
Thus, Section 1 of the Revised
Guidelines, which took effect 1 September 2017, provides that the guidelines “shall
apply to all newly-filed criminal cases, including those governed by Special
Laws and Rules, in the First and Second Level Courts, the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals as of effectivity date. The Revised Guidelines shall
also apply to pending criminal cases with respect to the remainder of the
proceedings.” Evidently, the Revised Guidelines apply in the instant case,
pending since 2015 but the prosecution has yet to present its first witness. (underscoring
supplied)
D.
Sec. 7 of SCC 38-1998
(Period from Arraignment to Trial)
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding Sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-calendar-month period following
its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to
trial imposed by said provision shall be ... eighty (80) days.”
Here, the
pre-trial conference was conducted sometime in 2015 and the prosecution was scheduled
to present its evidence and witnesses. Three years have lapsed but trial has
not commenced because the prosecution has not been able to present its first
witness. Clearly, this is a violation of the limit imposed by Section 7 of SCC
38-1998 on the period from arraignment to trial.
“A defendant has
no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty
of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.” (Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
191411, Jul 15, 3013)
E.
Sec. 8 of SCC 38-1998
(Time Limit for Trial)
“In criminal cases involving
persons charged with a crime, except those subject to the Rule on Summary
Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6)
months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, the court shall, after consultation
with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for
continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In
no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from
the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Court
Administrator pursuant to Section 2, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court.”
The prosecution has moved to reset hearing for six (6) times
already since 2015, which this Honorable Court has generously granted. For
sure, the prosecution has taken advantage of the generosity of this Honorable
Court and the acquiescence of the accused. These postponements, mostly for
dubious reasons, has prolonged the time elapsed to three (3) years without the
accused having his case tried, indeed a violation of the time limit for trial.
“Jurisprudence dictates that the right is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.” (Roquero v. Chancellor of
UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010)
F.
Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
(Failure to Prosecute)
“If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in
chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint
may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim
in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.”
The time allowed to
elapse in the instant case without the first prosecution witness appearing in
court is unreasonable and violative of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court. Since the pre-trial conference in 2015, a period of three (3) years, the
prosecution has failed miserably to prosecute this case. Rather, it has
resorted to postponement after postponement, to the prejudice of the accused. Since
the filing of the Information in June 2014 the accused has suffered anxiety
caused by the inordinate delay in the prosecution of this case. What is more,
his professional reputation as a prominent local journalist of sterling
credentials has been tainted by the allegations against him.
In Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court
declared that “even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he
is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud
of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be
drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.”
(Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 399, 917 (2004)
In citing several dismissed
cases due to inordinate delay, the Supreme Court ruled in Remulla that “due to the manifest prejudice caused to the accused
therein, the Court no longer gave weighty consideration to their lack of
objection during the period of delay. It was emphasized in those cases that it
was the duty of the prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case
regardless if the accused failed to object to the delay.” (Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 218040, April 17, 2017)
G.
Sec. 16, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution
“All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.”
Speedy disposition of cases is one of our
constitutional rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
The protection it guarantees is sacred and the right it bestows upon every
person is inherent.
In fact, the Supreme Court could never
have been more emphatic in advancing the extensive protection guaranteed by the
aforesaid constitutional provision when it acknowledged in Coscolluela that it is “one of three provisions mandating speedier
dispensation of justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to ‘a speedy disposition
of their case’; includes within its contemplation the periods before, during
and after trial; and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which
guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the
protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after
the submission of the case…” (Coscolluela
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, Jul 15, 3013)
The recital
of the violation of statutes, jurisprudence and rules expounded in the
preceding paragraphs vis-à-vis Section
16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, leaves no doubt that the constitutional
right of the herein accused to a speedy disposition of his case has been
violated. Therefore, the Honorable Court has no other recourse but to dismiss
the instant case.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, accused respectfully prays of this Honorable Court to deny
plaintiff’s urgent motion to reset the hearing of this case set on September
12, 2018, and to dismiss the instant case.
Other relief just and equitable under
premises is likewise prayed for.
Respectfully submitted.
September 11, 2018, Tacloban City.
By:
Atty. Pablo Ruiz Picasso
CABANACAN DALI and PICASSO
Counsel for Accused
Roll of Attorneys No. 72121
Lifetime IBP Membership No. 021212, 12/27/14
PTR No. 7654321, 01/15/18, Tacloban City
MCLE Compliance No. V-0012272.
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