Friday, September 28, 2018

PEOPLE v. MARGARITA, et al.



Republic of the Philippines
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
8th Judicial Region
Branch 34
Bulwagan Ng Katarungan
Tacloban City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
                                         Plaintiff,

-    versus -                                
Criminal Case No. 99-06-120
For: FRUSTRATED MURDER

ROGELIO MARGARITA,
DANILO MARGARITA,
FELICITO BALILING, &
SONOY DOE
                                         Accused.
x----------------------------------------x

DECISION


“When you tell the truth, you don’t  have to remember anything.” - Mark Twain

At bar is the above-captioned case charging Rogelio Margarita, Danilo Margarita, Felicito Baliling and Sonoy Doe for the crime of Frustrated Murder.

The Information charging all accused on April 28, 1999, reads as follows:

“That on or about 3:00 o’clock, A.M., March 14, 1999 at San Jose, Tacloban City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed with a bolo knife or machete, and with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapon, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one RENANTE ONGIS, by holding and kicking the latter and hacking him, thereby inflicting upon said Renante Ongis physical injury described as follows:

Hacking wound, about 5 inches in length, on his forehead slanting from his right eye going up to the middle of his forehead.

thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced Murder as a consequence but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the free will of the accused, as their evil designs were foiled by nearby Barangay tanods who, attracted by the commotion, rescued and brought the victim to the hospital for timely medical intervention .”

            CONTRARY TO LAW.

On June 16, 1999, accused Rogelio Margarita, Danilo Margarita and Felicito Baliling were arraigned.

All three accused after having been arraigned entered their respective plea of NOT GUILTY.

On October 15, 1999, pre-trial was conducted pursuant to the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The prosecution was represented by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Percival S. Cana and the accused Rogelio Margarita and Danilo Margarita, assisted by counsel Atty. Evelyn R. Lesigues, and accused Felicito Baliling, assisted by counsel Atty. Lauro A. P. Castillo, appeared.

The prosecution did not mark any documentary evidence and manifested that the marking will be made during the course of the trial.

On the part of the accused, the counsels did not mark any documentary evidence nor offer any stipulation of facts.

1.      RENANTE ONGIS, 27 years old, single, unemployed, and resident of Brgy. Tagiktik, San Jose, Tacloban City, after being duly sworn to in accordance with law, testified as follows, for the purpose of proving the material allegations in the Information:

He testified that on Saturday, March 13, 1999 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening he was at the house of his employer, Artemio, whose family name he did not know, in Brgy. 83-C, Tagiktik, San Jose, Tacloban City. His employer Artemio is a contractor for car painting. That he, Renante Ongis, was at Artemio’s house that evening to get his wage. Artemio pays him Nine hundred pesos (Php 900.00) a week as a helper in car painting. On that same evening his co-employees Chicay, Lito, and Rolly Tipanan were also at his employer’s house to get their wages. After they were paid their wages, Artemio invited them to a drinking session. They started drinking at about 8:00 P.M. and by the time they finished their drinking session at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning the following day of March 14, 1999, they had consumed twelve (12) bottles of beer grande. Thereafter, Ongis accompanied Rolly Tipanan, Chicay, and Lito to the highway so his co-employees could take their rides home. The highway is about two hundred (200) meters from Artemio’s house. On their way to the highway, they noticed that there was some fighting going on but they did not mind it and just proceeded to the highway. After Lito took his ride home, Renante decided to go home because he felt sleepy.

On his way home his arms were suddenly held by Felicito Baliling on the right and Danilo Margarita on the left. And immediately Rogelio Margarita kicked him on the abdomen. Right after he was kicked by Rogelio Margarita, he was hacked on the head by Sonoy Salvacion (Sonoy Doe) with a long bolo or “sundang,” hitting his forehead. On the witness stand, Renante showed a scar, about 5 inches in length, on his forehead slanting from his right eye going up to the middle of his forehead. He also testified that the vision in his right eye has been blurred since the hacking.

In open court, Ongis positively identified Rogelio Margarita, Danilo Margarita and Felicito Baliling. Sonoy Doe remains at-large. After he was hacked, Ongis testified that all of the accused scampered away.

Renante Ongis was brought to the hospital by Barangay Tanods and was treated and remained confined for one week. He presented a Statement of Account issued by the Divine Word Hospital in the amount of P30,541.25 (Exhibits “A” and “A-1”) as the amount he paid the hospital. It took over a year before he was able to return to work.

On cross-examination, Ongis stated that on his way home from the highway he had to pass by that same place where there was trouble, and it was in this place where the incident happened. That at the time of the incident he did not know the names of the accused; he was only familiar with their faces. He found out the names of the accused only after their arrest. That the policemen who arrested the accused were not present during the incident, only the barangay tanods were there. He also did not know the name of the person who hacked him, Sonoy Doe, at the time of the incident but was familiar with his face.

The witness was shown his affidavit and confirmed that it was the same affidavit he signed at the emergency room of the hospital at 7:00 AM of March 14, 1999. He also confirmed that when the policeman asked him to sign the affidavit it was already prepared for him. That he was having a hard time reading it because of the problem with his right eye but he affixed his signature anyway after being assured by the police that what was stated in the affidavit reflected what happened during the incident on the early morning of March 14, 1999. The witness testified that after he was hacked all the accused and himself ran away.

2.      EDWIN LABO, 38 years old, Barangay Tanod and resident of Burayan, San Jose, Tacloban City, testified to prove that he saw the group of the accused maltreat and hack the victim on the date stated in the Information.

Under direct-testimony, Labo testified that he and Crispin Batingting, also a barangay tanod, were on duty at the time of the incident and were posted at the corner of Burayan and the street leading towards Taguiktik. He saw Rogelio Margarita, Felicito Baliling, Danilo Margarita and Sonoy approach the corner and block the way of Renante Ongis, who was on his way home. Hee testified that Danilo Margarita kicked Ongis while Rogelio and Felicito held the Ongis’s arms. After Ongis was kicked, Sonoy hacked him and the four ran towards San Jose but were intercepted by policemen. Labo brought the victim to the hospital.

The witness positively identified accused Rogelio and Danilo Margarita in open court. When asked about Felicito Baliling he stated that the accused was not present in court.

On cross-examination, the witness stated that after the victim was kicked and when he was hacked and no longer being held by his arms, Sonoy hacked him while the three accused were not doing anything. He affirmed the contents and veracity of his Joint Affidavit with Crispin Batingting. In his joint affidavit, he stated that it was Rogelio Margarita who kicked the victim. Pressed further, he testified that Danilo and Rogelio kicked the victim; then stating that he saw Danilo kick the victim, and then confirming that Rogelio did not kick the victim. After the victim was hacked, Labo took the victim to the hospital and the other tanod chased the accused.

After the testimony of Edwin Labo, the prosecution manifested in open court that the testimony of another prosecution witness, barangay tanod Crispin Batingting, is dispensed with. The Medical Certificate, having been admitted by the defense as to its genuineness, the Findings marked as Exhibit “B-1” and the attending physician’s signature as Exhibit “B-2,” were admitted in evidence for the purposes to which they were offered.

The prosecution rested its case and the presentation of defense evidence followed:

1.      ROGELIO MARGARITA was presented as the first defense witness and stated that he was 28 years old, single and resident of Brgy. Paraiso, San Jose, Tacloban City. His testimony was offered for the purpose of denying the charges in the Information that he acted in conspiracy with the other accused, Danny Margarita and Felicito Baliling, in hacking the victim in this case.

At 3:00 AM of March 14, 1999, the witness and his elder brother, Danilo Margarita, had just arrived at the corner of Burayan on their way to Taguiktik to buy cigarettes. They were not able to buy cigarettes because they were met at the corner by Renante Ongis and three others. Ongis immediately delivered punches on Rogelio Margarita, hitting Rogelio on his left neck. Rogelio fell to the ground and when he stood up Ongis said, “We will still see each other.” Rogelio did not know any of them by their names but knew Ongis by his face and nickname Santik because they sometimes meet at the billiard hall. While this was going on, Ongis’s companions were by the Santol tree towards the left. Danilo Margarita, Rogelio’s brother, was by the side of the road towards the right. When Rogelio stood up he didn’t say anything and just approached his brother Danilo who was talking to barangay tanod Edwin Labo. Ongis was on his way to the hospital, wounded on the forehead because of trouble at the interior of the road. Ongis was already wounded when he punched Rogelio. According to the witness, his brother Danilo uttered that there was someone by the banana plant. When asked what he and his brother did next, Rogelio said they decided to go home. They did not proceed to buy the cigarettes anymore, concerned that they could get involved with what just happened. But they did not reach home because they were apprehended by the tanods, the same tanods that Danilo was having a conversation with earlier. They were being arrested as the suspect in the wounding of Renante Ongis. When the police arrived, Rogelio and his brother were taken to the San Jose Police Station.

When asked why he was still awake at around 3:00 A.M., Rogelio replied that his elder brother woke him up at 2:00 A.M. so together they could ferry a passenger to V&G subdivision. The passenger was already with his brother in the motor cab. After ferrying the passenger, they turned in the motor cab to another brother’s house. They charged the passenger Php40.00 for the trip to V&G.  It was about 3:00 A.M. when they left on foot towards Tagiktik to buy cigarettes, and that is when the incident occurred. He did not know Sonoy at the time of the incident; he got to know him only during the trial of this case

On cross-examination, Rogelio Margarita admitted that it was only on that occasion on March 14, 1999, that Danilo ever woke him up in the early morning hours to accompany Danilo in ferrying a passenger because the place where the passenger was going was rather far. However, it was pointed out to him that the trip was only from Paraiso to V&G, not a far distance, but he did not respond. They did not leave right away for V&G when he was roused at 2:00 A.M. because Danilo was still negotiating with the passenger, although the passenger was already on board the motor cab. It was about 3:00 A.M. when they arrived at Paraiso from V&G.

On their way from Paraiso walking towards Tagiktik to buy cigarettes, they were blocked at the corner of Burayan by Ongis who immediately punched Rogelio for no apparent reason. Rogelio was not aware if Ongis was already wounded when the latter approached and punched him. When he was punched, his brother Danilo was just nearby talking to the barangay tanod, but Danilo and the tanod did not do anything, even after he told Danilo, within hearing distance of the tanod, that he had been punched. Also, he did not retaliate after he was punched, or ask the tanod to arrest Ongis; neither did he file a complaint against the tanod who arrested him nor the policemen who detained him.

2.      FELICITO BALILING, 28 years old, single, an employee of Maxwan, Tacloban City and a resident of Brgy. 83, Paraiso, San Jose, Tacloban City. His testimony was offered to deny the accusation and the testimony of prosecution witnesses and to testify on other matters relative to this case including his age at the time of the incident.

He testified that he was born on September 28, 1982, and that he was 16 years old at the time of the incident. A photocopy of a Certificate of Live Birth of Felicito Baliling, after stipulation by the prosecution of the age of the witness, was marked as Exhibit “1”.

At about 3:00 A.M. on March 14, 1999, he and several friends were at the corner of Burayan on their way home from a friend’s birthday party when they noticed a fistfight. During the incident he was just behind barangay tanods Butiktik and Labo, who were just watching the fistfight. He noticed about 5 people, including Ongis, were involved in the fistfight. Then he saw Sonoy hack Renante Ongis, then the people, including his companions, scampered to different directions. He testified that he knew the Margarita brothers and Sonoy (but not his family name) prior to the incident because they are from the same barangay. He also knew Renante Ongis prior to the incident only by his face. He said he was arrested by a police officer after he was pinpointed by the barangay tanod as one of the culprits.

On cross-examination, he testified that he was about an arm’s length behind the tanod and about 8 to 10 meters from Ongis while the fistfight was going on. According to him, the tanods noticed that he was just behind them, including the tanod that pinpointed him. As far as he was concerned, the tanods witnessed the fistfight and saw how Ongis was hacked. Ongis was alone during the incident. There were about 5 persons involved in the fight but he did not see the Margarita brothers during the incident; he only saw Sonoy who hacked Ongis but did not notice where the latter was hit. He was the only one from his group that was implicated by the tanod because, unlike his companions, he did not run. He did not complain when arrested because the police officer was pointing a gun at him.

He was taken to the San Jose Police Station, where he saw the Margarita brothers because the police also arrested the latter. He does not know why Ongis implicated him but the two of them did not have any misunderstanding before the incident. He does not know what the Margarita brothers do, whether they are tricycle drivers or not. Although they are from the same barangay, they live far from each other. When asked if he will agree if told that the Margarita brothers admitted that they were present during the fistfight, he answered in the negative.

3.      DANILO MARGARITA, 42 years old, married, tricycle driver and a resident of Brgy. Paraiso, San Jose, Tacloban City. His testimony was offered to belie the allegations of the prosecution witnesses and testify as to what transpired before, during, and after the incident; and to other matters relative to this case.

At around 2:30 in the morning of March 14, 1999, he was at home still awake. He roused his younger brother, Rogelio, his co-accused in this case, from sleep to accompany him in ferrying a passenger to V&G in their motorcycle for hire (MCH). After taking the passenger to V&G, they returned home to Paraiso and left the MCH there since his elder brother was going to use it to get fish from the fish shed. After about 15 minutes, he and Rogelio proceeded on foot to Taguiktik, on the opposite side of Paraiso, to buy cigarettes. After 10 minutes of walking and still on the way to the store, Rogelio was blocked by Ongis and about 4 companions. Thereafter Rogelio was punched by Ongis in the presence of barangay tanod Edwin Labo, who did not do anything even when Danilo asked him to stop Ongis. He then told his brother that they would be going home. When asked, Danilo confirmed that it was the same barangay tanod who arrested him and his bother later on, but he does not know the reason why they were arrested.

He denied blocking the way of Ongis and holding the latter’s arm when a certain Sonoy hacked victim. Further, Danilo denied knowing Renante Ongis prior to the incident and only got to know the latter after he was arrested. Danilo testified that he did not know what Rogelio did after the latter was punched by Ongis and companions, and Danilo did not know if Rogelio was hit. He also did not know if Ongis was already injured or not when the latter punched Rogelio. Meanwhile, this was all happening right in front of the barangay tanod who accordingly was talking to Danilo.

On cross-examination, Danilo said that he was driving the motorcycle on March 13, 1999. However, when asked what time he started driving, he said that he did not drive on that day. It was not until 2:30 in the morning of March 14, 1999, that he decided to go out and look for passengers. Although his brother was going to use the MCH to go to the fish shed, he still decided to take the passenger because the passenger was right there at their place and was only going to V&G. He was paid P40.00 by the passenger whom Danilo claimed he did not know. On their way back from V&G they passed by the Burayan junction going towards Taguiktik, but it did not occur to them to buy cigarettes. His other brother who was going to the fish shed would also have to pass by the same junction but it did not likewise occur to them to hitch a ride from their brother.

The defense did not ask any re-direct questions but formally offered the Certificate of Live Birth of Felicito Baliling as Exhibit “1” to prove his minority, with no objection from the prosecution. 

CAREFUL EVALUATION of the foregoing assertions and circumstances will show that the story weaved by accused Rogelio Margarita, Danilo Margarita and Felicito Baliling are inconsistent with common experience and reason, which render their testimonies self-serving and highly suspect.

First, the explanation offered by Rogelio and Danilo Margarita as to why they were still awake at 3:00 o’clock in the morning is ludicrous and utterly dubious. Danilo said that he did not drive the motor cab on March 13, 1999. It was not until 2:30 in the morning of March 14, 1999, that he decided to go out and look for passengers. So he roused his brother Rogelio at about 2:30 A.M. so the latter could accompany him in ferrying a passenger to V&G. Danilo woke up Rogelio even before the former and the unknown passenger had agreed on the amount of the fare. Now they would have everyone believe that they ferried the passenger, a total stranger, at the ungodly hour of 2:30 in the morning from Paraiso to V&G subdivision – and all that trouble for a measly forty pesos!

Second, the reason the brothers gave for going to Tagiktik in the wee hours of the morning was to buy cigarettes. Their return trip from V&G to Paraiso would pass by the junction of Burayan towards Tagiktik; however, they proceeded straight to Paraiso because their brother will use the MCH to go to the fish shed. Although on the way to the fish shed their brother would also have to pass by the same junction, they did not hitch a ride from their brother. Instead, from Paraiso, at 3:00 A.M., they decided to walk the arduous distance towards Tagiktik. An unlikely scenario that challenges elemental reasoning.

Third, the Margarita brothers’ narrative as to what happened next on their way to Tagiktik is akin to a badly written script of a fantastic tale. Accordingly, when they reached the junction in Burayan, Rogelio was blocked by Renante Ongis and 3 or 4 companions. Thereafter, Rogelio was punched, for no apparent reason, by Ongis right in the presence of barangay tanods Edwin Labo, and Crispin Batingting, who did not do anything to break the fight. And on the part of Danilo, all he did was just tell his brother that they would be going home. The tanods did not arrest Ongis and his supposed companions. Rogelio did not file a complaint against Ongis or the tanods.

According to Rogelio, Renante Ongis was already wounded and was on his way to the hospital when the latter punched Rogelio. The punch, hitting his neck, was so hard that he fell down. When he stood up, he did not retaliate or do anything except approach his brother who told him that they would be going home.

Fourth, Felicito Baliling’s non-felicitous narrative inferring supernatural powers on the Margarita brothers as invisible men. While the Margarita brothers admitted they were at the scene of the incident, he claimed that he did not see the brothers although he saw Sonoy Doe hack Ongis. It would have been impossible for him not to see the Margarita brothers since he claimed he was just behind the tanod during the incident. Both Rogelio and Danilo testified that the latter was talking to Labo as the fighting transpired.

Finally, the testimonies of the three accused denying any involvement in the hacking of Renante Ongis were uncorroborated. In fact, other than the accused themselves, there were no other defense witnesses presented. Their collective and composite tale appears as if it was simply contrived to bolster a weak attempt at denying the charges. In Ocampo v. People (528 SCRA 547, 560), the Supreme Court held that the time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man. Thus, in People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 192250, July 11, 2012), the Supreme Court declared that whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance. Here, the tale, as can be discerned from such standards, is clearly incredible

On the other hand, the version of events recounted by the private complainant is highly credible. Renante Ongis’s testimony that he was kicked by Rogelio Margarita while Danilo Margarita and Felicito Baliling held his arms, and then was hacked by Sonoy Doe, is corroborated by two prosecution witnesses – barangay tanods Edwin Labo and Crispin Batingting. What is more, Renante Ongis positively identified all three accused in open court while prosecution witness Edwin Labo positively identified accused Rogelio Margarita and Danilo Margarita. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in People v. Faustino (394 Phil. 236, 259 (2000)), ruled that the identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case for the prosecution. Here, the identification by prosecution witnesses of the accused was conclusive and reliable.

Renante Ongis testified that it was Rogelio who kicked him, while Edwin Labo exhibited some confusion, vacillating from Danilo to Rogelio, to both and, finally, to Danilo, as the person who kicked Ongis. Such inconsistency in the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses is minor and understandable. In fact, as the Supreme Court held in People vs. Dando (325 SCRA 406), they only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Considering the similarity in the facial features and build of the Margarita brothers, it is not surprising that the witness could get a bit confused. What is important in this case is the fact that all three prosecution witnesses were one in saying that the accused were the perpetrators.


As to the crime committed, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery as alleged in the Information was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The Supreme Court, citing Untied States v. Rana (4 Phil., 231) in People v. Manlangit (73 SCRA 49), declared that “as the [qualifying] circumstance of treachery (alevosia) is an important one, in considering it, it should by all means be based on some positive and conclusive proof and not merely upon hypothetical facts, drawn more or less logically, because it is necessary that the existence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime should be proven as fully as the crime itself, in order to aggravate the penalty incurred by the guilty party.” Such standard of proof is wanting in this case. Indeed, prosecution witness Edwin Labo testified on cross-examination that Danilo Margo and Felicito Baliling were no longer holding the victim Renante Ongis when the latter was hacked by Sonoy Doe. What is more, the incident happened in the presence and plain view of barangay tanods who were on patrol. Thus, “positive and conclusive proof” of treachery is utterly lacking. Hence, absent the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is merely frustrated homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

In considering the criminal liability incurred by the accused, their degree of participation must be established whether or not the responsibility is in the character of a principal or co-principal. In the leading case of People v. Tamayo (G.R. No. L18289, November 17, 1922), the Supreme Court held, in what has been known since as the Tamayo doctrine, that “[p]articipation on the part of an accomplice in the criminal design of the principal is essential to the same extent as such participation is necessary on the part of one charged as co-principal, nevertheless, it is evident, … that, as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes draw the inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from acts of concert in the consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered, where it would not draw the same inference for the purpose of holding the same accused in the character of principal. This is because, in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility."

The express testimony of prosecution witnesses, corroborated by no less than accused Felicito Baliling, clearly established that it was Sonoy Doe/Sonoy Salvacion who delivered the hacking blow with a machete and inflicted the wound on the victim. With all three accused in the case at bar, possessing no weapon and merely using their hands and a foot to deliver a single kick to the victim before and not during the hacking, certainly their responsibility is of the “milder form.”      

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, accused Rogelio Margarita, Danilo Margarita and Felicito Baliling are hereby pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplices, of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against Renante Ongis and each of them is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision correccional as maximum.  They are hereby further ordered to indemnify the victim the total amount of Thirty Thousand Five Hundred Forty-One Pesos and Twenty-Five Centavos as actual damages.

This court takes judicial notice of the age of accused Felicito Baliling, who was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. However, considering his present age of 29 years, this court hereby orders service of sentence pursuant to Section 38 of R.A. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, and Section 48 of A.M. 02-01-18-SC, November 24, 2009, or the Revised Rules on Children in Conflict with the Law.


NO COST.


October 15, 2011.


SO ORDERED.


JESUS BALLESTEROS CABANACAN

Pretending Judge-Designate

Monday, September 24, 2018

PEOPLE v. MONET, Criminal Case No. 99458 for Libel


Republic of the Philippines
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
8th Judicial Region
Branch 6
Bulwagan Ng Katarungan
Tacloban City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
                                      Plaintiff,

-   versus -                                                    Criminal Case No. 99458
for Libel

OSCAR CLAUDE MONET
                                      Accused.
---------------------------------------------

OPPOSITION TO URGENT MOTION TO RESET HEARING WITH PRAYER FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE INSTANT CASE

          Accused Oscar Claude Monet, by counsel, respectfully states:

1.       On September 11, 2018, plaintiff filed an urgent motion to reset the hearing set on September 12, 2018, at 8:30 a.m. on the ground that his first witness is not available on September 12, 2018.

2.        But accused must oppose the urgent motion and pray for the dismissal of the instant case.

3.     It will be recalled that the prosecution has moved for resetting of the hearings for six (6) times already since 2015, which the Court generously granted. The urgent motion to reset is again based on an equivocal ground that the first witness for the prosecution is not available. This is unjustified.

BACKGROUND

An Information for Libel with Damages was filed before this Court on June 26, 2014, against the accused, with John Ruskin as the private complainant. Sometime in February 2015, the pre-trial conference was conducted and the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence and witnesses. However, for more than three (3) years now, the prosecution has failed to present its first witness.

ARGUMENT

A.               Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court (Three-day Notice Rule)

          “Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.”

          The prosecution’s urgent motion to reset the hearing scheduled on September 12, 2018, was filed on September 11, 2018, or only one day before the scheduled hearing. This is a violation of the three-day rule notice under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.

          “The rule is that a party asking for postponement has absolutely no right to assume that its motion would be granted, especially on less than three days’ notice, and must be in court prepared on the day of the hearing.” (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 123997, January 20, 1999)

B.               Sec. 10 of Supreme Court Circular
38-1998 (Factors for Granting Continuance)

 “x x x. No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 9 hereof shall be granted because of congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.”

In the urgent motion, the prosecution does not cite any justifiable reason(s) as to why the witness is unavailable and/or whether due diligence has been exercised by the prosecution to ensure availability of the witness considering that, three (3) years and six continuances later, it has failed to present its first witness. Fittingly, the urgent motion falls under the enumeration of factors in Section 10 of SSC 38-1998 where continuance shall not be granted and, therefore, must be denied.

C.               Sec. III (2) (d) of OCA Circular No. 101-2017, Revised
Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases

 “(d) Motion for Postponement. – A motion for postponement is prohibited, except if it is based on acts of God, force majeure or physical inability of the witness to appear and testify. If the motion is granted based on such expectations, the moving party shall be warned that the presentation of its evidence must still be finished on the dates previously agreed upon.”

The basis for postponement indicated in the urgent motion to reset hearing is that “the first witness for the prosecution is not available…”  However, the reason propounded by plaintiff does not fall under any of the exceptions to the prohibition on the Motion for Postponement, to wit: acts of God, force majeure or physical inability of the witness to appear and testify. A witness presumed being “not available” does not necessarily mean the existence of a “physical inability” to appear and testify. Non-availability could merely be due to the witness attending to a matter he perceives to be more important than testifying in court, which is a matter of choice, whereas physical inability signifies the impossibility of bodily appearing in court due to circumstances beyond his control.  

          Indeed, the rationale for the implementation of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases (Revised Guidelines) is “to protect and advance the constitutional rights of persons to a speedy disposition of their criminal cases, to reinforce and give teeth to the existing rules on criminal procedure and other special rules prescribing periods for court action and those which promote speedy disposition of criminal cases.”

          Thus, Section 1 of the Revised Guidelines, which took effect 1 September 2017, provides that the guidelines “shall apply to all newly-filed criminal cases, including those governed by Special Laws and Rules, in the First and Second Level Courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals as of effectivity date. The Revised Guidelines shall also apply to pending criminal cases with respect to the remainder of the proceedings.” Evidently, the Revised Guidelines apply in the instant case, pending since 2015 but the prosecution has yet to present its first witness. (underscoring supplied)

D.               Sec. 7 of SCC 38-1998
(Period from Arraignment to Trial)

“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be ... eighty (80) days.”

Here, the pre-trial conference was conducted sometime in 2015 and the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence and witnesses. Three years have lapsed but trial has not commenced because the prosecution has not been able to present its first witness. Clearly, this is a violation of the limit imposed by Section 7 of SCC 38-1998 on the period from arraignment to trial.
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.” (Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, Jul 15, 3013)

E.               Sec. 8 of SCC 38-1998
(Time Limit for Trial)

“In criminal cases involving persons charged with a crime, except those subject to the Rule on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the court shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Court Administrator pursuant to Section 2, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court.”

The prosecution has moved to reset hearing for six (6) times already since 2015, which this Honorable Court has generously granted. For sure, the prosecution has taken advantage of the generosity of this Honorable Court and the acquiescence of the accused. These postponements, mostly for dubious reasons, has prolonged the time elapsed to three (3) years without the accused having his case tried, indeed a violation of the time limit for trial. 

          Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.” (Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010)

F.                Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
(Failure to Prosecute)

“If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.”

The time allowed to elapse in the instant case without the first prosecution witness appearing in court is unreasonable and violative of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Since the pre-trial conference in 2015, a period of three (3) years, the prosecution has failed miserably to prosecute this case. Rather, it has resorted to postponement after postponement, to the prejudice of the accused. Since the filing of the Information in June 2014 the accused has suffered anxiety caused by the inordinate delay in the prosecution of this case. What is more, his professional reputation as a prominent local journalist of sterling credentials has been tainted by the allegations against him.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court declared that “even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.” (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 399, 917 (2004)

In citing several dismissed cases due to inordinate delay, the Supreme Court ruled in Remulla that “due to the manifest prejudice caused to the accused therein, the Court no longer gave weighty consideration to their lack of objection during the period of delay. It was emphasized in those cases that it was the duty of the prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case regardless if the accused failed to object to the delay.” (Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 218040, April 17, 2017)

G.              Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.”

Speedy disposition of cases is one of our constitutional rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution. The protection it guarantees is sacred and the right it bestows upon every person is inherent.  

In fact, the Supreme Court could never have been more emphatic in advancing the extensive protection guaranteed by the aforesaid constitutional provision when it acknowledged in Coscolluela that it is “one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to ‘a speedy disposition of their case’; includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial; and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case…” (Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, Jul 15, 3013)

The recital of the violation of statutes, jurisprudence and rules expounded in the preceding paragraphs vis-à-vis Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, leaves no doubt that the constitutional right of the herein accused to a speedy disposition of his case has been violated. Therefore, the Honorable Court has no other recourse but to dismiss the instant case.

PRAYER

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused respectfully prays of this Honorable Court to deny plaintiff’s urgent motion to reset the hearing of this case set on September 12, 2018, and to dismiss the instant case.

          Other relief just and equitable under premises is likewise prayed for.

          Respectfully submitted.

          September 11, 2018, Tacloban City.

By:


Atty. Pablo Ruiz Picasso
CABANACAN DALI and PICASSO
Counsel for Accused
Roll of Attorneys No. 72121
Lifetime IBP Membership No. 021212, 12/27/14
PTR No. 7654321, 01/15/18, Tacloban City
MCLE Compliance No. V-0012272.